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Abstract— Virus Monitoring and Analysis System (VMAS) is 
generally used for monitoring and capturing virus behavior, 
and it can produce a report analysis which can be used by 
expert user to learn virus activity. There are several tools 
which have this capability, such as: Joebox, ThreatExpert, 
CWSandbox, and Sysinternals. Turns out, these tools are not 
fully perfect in analyzing the virus behavior. Therefore in this 
paper, we propose a technique to defeat such tools, by 
exploiting the limitation of VMAS in term of time monitoring, 
by introducing a new virus exploiting technique called Delayed 
Trigger Technique (DTT).  
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
The existence of computer virus is undebatable making 
worry for computer users in all over the world. Indeed, there 
is an antivirus software that can be utilized to detect, prevent, 
and kill the virus from outside. But this is only for common 
users that do not care about behavior of virus in details. For 
particular users, especially those who interested to learn and 
analyse the virus behavior, they should use Virus Monitoring 
and Analysis System (VMAS), in which it can capture all 
virus activity accurately and generate the analysis report 
[1][2][3]. Further, by reading this report, expert users will be 
able to eliminate the virus from the PC and recover the 
Operating System [3]. There are several tools which capable 
to perform this things, e.g. Joebox [4], ThreatExpert  [5], 
CWSandbox [2], and Sysinternals [6]. Although they can 
capture the behavior and produce the report, but they still 
have a limitation especially in term of time monitoring, that 
is a limited time frame which used to monitor and analyse as 
many suspicious binaries as possible [1]. 
This research focuses on VMAS which uses behavior or 
dynamic analysis, rather than static analysis. Moreover, this 
research pays more attention on the monitoring time which 
owned by VMAS to monitor and capture virus activity. This 
is because it could be a weakness of such system to be 
defeated. In this paper, we perform an experiment that will 
show how DTT capable to trick VMAS. 
Section II of this paper describes the background of this 
research. Section III explains what Delayed Trigger 
Technique is, and an overview about this technique. In 
section IV, we perform the testing phase and followed by the 
result analysis in section V. The conclusion and future works 
will be discussed in section VI. 
II. BACKGROUND 
VMAS is a tool which concerning on virus behavior 
analysis and it generally can produce the report that showing 
the analysis result comes from data captured [1].  Actually 
there are two common methods which used in VMAS to 
perform analysis process, namely static and dynamic analysis.  
Static analysis is performed by decoding the virus file, 
and analysing the code one by one, without actually 
executing the file [7]. Static analysis is less popular 
compared to dynamic analysis, because malware including 
virus is usually already well-protected to avoid static analysis, 
so it is hard to be disassembled [1][8]. This statement is also 
supported by [7], in which on their experiment, they found 
that approximately 90% of virus binary code cannot be fully 
disassembled by state of art disassembler. 
On the other side, dynamic analysis is an opposite 
technique of static analysis. This technique will not touch the 
code at all, but it executes the malicious file instead, and 
observes behavior of the virus directly [9]. There are several 
general steps during conducting monitoring and analysis for 
virus behavior [1][2][3][10][11]. The first step to do is by 
putting the virus into a controllable environment, and tests it 
directly. The virus will be monitored for a certain time along. 
During this time, all activity of the viruses will be captured 
until the monitoring process is stopped. All information 
retrieved will be put into a single report, and this report is 
what needed by user to analyse virus behavior.  
The problem here is, by using this dynamic analysis, 
there is a limited time in monitoring phase [1]. This 
restriction actually is intended in order that the monitoring 
process will not take a long time [1]. Turns out, this time 
limitation led to a new hole that vulnerable to be attacked. 
Further, virus maker can utilize this hole to trick and 
penetrate the system. 
There are several researchers that discussed about VMAS 
as well as the comparison among VMASs [1][2][3][10][11]. 
Their research is actually to improve the performance of 
VMAS by comparing each other, but they never focus on 
penetrating VMAS to know how secure it is. In this paper, 
we attempt to find the hole of VMAS by attacking it directly. 
The next section will discuss about the technique which used 
in our experiment. 
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III. DELAYED TRIGGER TECHNIQUE 
Delayed trigger actually is not a new term in computer 
security world. This technique originally was used by worms 
to do “logical bomb” aggression into computer system, by 
replicating themselves to get a maximal dissemination [12]. 
The author of [13] also stated that delayed trigger is widely 
used by internet worms to lead a Trojan horse condition, in 
which they will attach themselves to the benign software and 
start to attack in the certain condition. Even though it was 
already used by worms, but actually they do not tend to use 
this technique to trick the VMAS.  
In this paper, we focus to utilize delayed trigger 
technique to penetrate the security part of VMAS which uses 
dynamic analysis method. Dynamic analysis method is 
generally used by VMAS to analyze the virus by putting it 
into the controllable environment [2][3][11] (i.e. sandbox or 
virtual machine). Inside the sandbox, the virus will be 
executed and system will capture all activity of viruses by 
trapping all system function which called by virus during 
monitoring time [1][2][3][11]. There are two approaches 
which used by VMAS to limit the monitoring time [1]. First, 
it will always monitor the virus activity until the process end, 
including the process done by its children. Second, if the 
process is too long and reach the timeout limit, the system 
will stop it immediately. As mentioned by authors of [1], the 
tolerance time which given to VMAS during monitoring 
session is maximal four minutes long. Unfortunately, besides 
it can give the definite time for VMAS and avoid the very 
long time scanning just to scan one virus file, this restriction 
could become the great weakness of VMAS as well. 
These two approaches can be tricked by virus which has 
Delayed Trigger Technique (DTT). It just pretends to act like 
benign file, and does not do some suspicious things for a 
certain time, with aim to trick the VMAS until it is truly free 
from VMAS monitoring. It could stay in idle condition or do 
some normal activities without doing malicious or suspicious 
one, i.e. touching the system files or duplicating itself, along 
five minutes or more. During that time, VMAS will only 
detect this file as a benign file as it does not do anything 
suspicious. When the virus is tested in the real environment, 
it still acts like normal file. But after certain minutes, the 
logical bomb will be detonated immediately, and 
unfortunately the virus is already free from VMAS 
monitoring. 
Based on the experiment which performed by [1], they 
conclude that virus will attack the target as soon as possible, 
and it means that the virus attack will be performed soon 
after they reach the target. It should be done immediately to 
avoid user doing some prevention things, i.e. turning off the 
computer and installing antivirus, which can protect the 
computer before virus starts to attack. It looks like opposite 
of delayed trigger technique, in which virus no need to attack 
the target in a hurry. As mentioned before, it could be the 
problem for virus itself if not immediately attacks, because it 
can be detected first by antivirus or user, or losing the chance 
to paralyze the computer target.  
This problem actually can be overcome by completing 
one important task, which is by modifying startup 
configuration either through registry, autoexec.bat, win.ini, 
or startup folder, so that it can be run every time computer 
starts up. Such modification is not categorized as a 
suspicious activity except if immediately followed by 
accessing system files [14]. But it is remains a virus, that 
always have the bad intention. And it will start to attack the 
target, after several minutes as determined by virus writer. 
Fig. 1 shows the overview of DTT. This is started from 
the virus with DTT that executed. In the first minute, this 
virus tries to add itself to the startup list. As stated in 
previous paragraph, this activity aims to execute the virus 
file every time when computer rebooted. It also serves to 
anticipate if user suddenly turning off the computer soon 
after the virus is executed, but not yet started to attack. Next, 
in the second minute, the virus performs in idle mode. It will 
do nothing to give the delayed trigger before virus start to 
attack. This condition is also done in the third and fourth 
minute. So, during the idle mode, VMAS will not detect any 
suspicious things. Idle mode is also used to finish the timeout 
limit which owned by VMAS. By performing idle mode 
until timeout limit, VMAS will report only one activity 
which done by virus during monitoring time, which is adding 
itself to startup list. So, after timeout limit is reached, in the 
fifth minute or more, the virus can start to perform malicious 
activities without successfully captured by VMAS. 
 
Figure 1.  An overview of Delayed Trigger Technique (DTT) 
After we created the virus with DTT included, 
furthermore we perform testing process and it will be 
discussed on the next section. 
IV. TESTING 
For this experiment, two viruses were created. These 
viruses have same attack technique actually, but different in 
term of availability of DTT inside them. In order to get the 
clear results, the developed virus here only focuses on 
attacks against windows registry. This is because registry is 
one of the popular characteristics of a computer virus, and 
that’s why it always be monitored by VMAS or even 
antivirus software [1][2][3][10][15]. The first virus here tries 
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to set six key values as depicted in Fig. 2. In this virus, there 
is no DTT included. Each process will be performed soon 
after the previous process is executed. After execute the sixth 
process (Reg F), the process will be stopped automatically. 
The second virus also will infect six registry keys like the 
first virus does, but it has DTT included with five minutes 
timeout limit. Five minutes is taken because it is fulfil the 
requirement of DTT in which the timeout limit should be 
more than four minutes. In this virus, DTT is located in 
between Reg A and Reg B as depicted in Fig. 3. The process 
will be started by executing Reg A, but not directly execute 
Reg B after that, since there is a DTT here. The idle process 
will run for four minutes. Next, Reg B, Reg C, Reg D, Reg E, 
and Reg F will be executed soon after the timeout limit of 
DTT is finish. Reg A should be there since it can be a trigger 
to keep the virus run in startup mode and locating itself into 
sleep or idle mode during timeout limit as a delayed trigger. 
But after timeout limit and after free from VMAS monitoring, 
however all parts of viruses will be executed and start to 
attack the computer.  
 
Figure 2.  The flow of the first virus attack (without DTT) 
 
Figure 3.  The flow of the second virus attack with DTT 
After both viruses created, the next step is to test them by 
putting them into VMAS. There are several tools which have 
this capability, such as Joebox  [4], ThreatExpert  [5], 
CWSandbox  [2], and Sysinternals [6]. Here, the viruses will 
be tested inside the Joebox and ThreatExpert, and waiting for 
the analysis report from them. The next section will discuss 
about the result derived from this experiment. 
V. RESULT 
By conducting the experiment as discussed in the 
previous section, it will come up with the report which able 
to prove that DTT technique turns out can be used to trick 
the VMAS. 
In the snippet report from joebox that shown in Fig. 4, it 
shows that the first virus performing six changes on registry 
keys. This data point out that all activity of this first virus can 
be recorded successfully by Joebox. Meanwhile, on the 
second report as depicted in Fig. 5, there is only one activity 
captured that can be reported by Joebox. When we tested the 
virus on ThreatExpert, it reported the same result like joebox 
report. If we perform comparison between the first report and 
the second one, we find the indication that DTT can work  
well to trick VMAS. So by this comparison, we can conclude 
that the second virus which uses DTT successfully tricks the 
joebox as a VMAS. Therefore, the limitation of VMAS 
especially in term of time monitoring is vurnerable to be 
penetrated by using DTT. Moreover, such incomplete 
information that recorded inside the report, can mislead user 
that try to analyze the virus based on the report produced. 
 
 
Figure 4.  Behavior analysis report of virus without DTT 
 
Figure 5.  Behavior analysis report of virus with DTT 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
There are several tools that able to be used to monitor 
and analyze the virus behavior. It is important to get the 
understanding for activity of certain virus by test it into 
these tools. Even though these tools are capable to 
analyze and produce the report in details, they are not 
really perfect since still can be tricked by virus which uses 
DTT. This is because such tools have time restriction for 
monitoring process. By using DTT, report produced will 
not show the complete information of virus behavior. 
Furthermore, such incomplete information can mislead 
the users who want to analyze virus activity from the 
report. 
Besides it can be a good way to limit the process so 
that does not wasting much time, it can be a weak point as 
well, as it can be utilized by virus to enter the system and 
performing delayed trigger technique while waiting for the 
free condition from monitoring process done by VMAS. In 
the future, we plan to use this technique to implement the 
fast attack detection technique in network intrusion 
detection system. 
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